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**CHANGING SECURITY THREATS: WHAT AFRICANS MUST
ACCOMMODATE IN THE XX1ST CENTURY**

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CHANGING SECURITY THREATS: WHAT AFRICANS MUST ACCOMMODATE IN THE
XXIST CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LtC A.L. Benadé, South African National Defense Force
TITLE: Changing Security Threats: What Africans must accommodate in the XXIst Century
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 30 March 1999 **PAGES:** 63 **CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

The increasing number of states in Sub-Saharan Africa that are failing has led to an extended and agonizing search for new international mechanisms to prevent the complete collapse of government structures and to begin the rehabilitation effort. The threat environment for Sub-Saharan Africa for the twenty first century paints a bleak picture for the region. A cooperative approach entailing decisive ways by international and continental role-players are necessary to stem the tide of deterioration. An aggressive strategy towards improved socio-economic conditions in the short term and regional development in the long term is critical to ensure Sub-Saharan Africa becomes part of- and play a participating role in the global economic community.

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CHANGING SECURITY THREATS: WHAT AFRICANS MUST ACCOMMODATE
IN THE XXIST CENTURY

Dramatic change after the end of the Cold War is affecting Africa and specifically Sub-Saharan Africa to a great extent. The end of the bipolar struggle allowed the origin of a concept of "new regionalism" that the world is now in the midst of. The topics of today's world range from NATO enlargement and future roles to the European Union (EU) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the case of Africa. These revitalized regional organizations and alliances are increasing in both number and visibility in today's world. Political advantages accrue to nations within these regional organizations. In addition, numerous economic benefits arise from a collective partnership, having greater bargaining strength in negotiations with external actors - be they donors, transnational corporations, international financial institutions or others.

'...regional groupings provide perhaps the only viable vehicle by which developing country governments can exert bargaining influence.'

John Weeks

None too soon for Africa! For Africa with its increasing instability and unhealthy economic growth, it has be-

come time to act responsibly if the continent wants to take its rightful place in world affairs.

It would be unjust not to recognize the efforts of African leaders like Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki from South Africa, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and most recent the newly elected president Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria that represent a new generation of leaders with a vision for a new Africa. Together they form an elite group, with aspirations for Africa that will benefit the whole by tackling similar domestic problems, though not in an identical manner.¹ The intent is to create conditions to change a culture from solving matters *over the barrel of a gun* to a culture *of peaceful solution and democracy* with the end state being *regional development*.

This paper focuses on the dynamics in Africa during the initial stages of the new millennium, how it might impact on the region south of the Sahara and what possible options are available for a coherent strategy.

THREATS

In 1990, it seemed reasonable to predict that the close of the Cold War conflict would lead to a substantial reduction of warfare in Africa. This was not the case. In the subregions of Sub-Saharan Africa namely, west Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central and southern Africa, the

breadth and duration of local conflict were amplified and extended due to divergent reasons. These reasons are to be discussed under the topics of natural disasters, cultural and social issues that enhance instability and external issues that impact on the region.

NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

Nature is playing a decisive role in the already delicate process of government evolution in Sub-Saharan Africa in ways not conducive to what is required for stability.

Natural Disasters. Over 75% of Africa lies within the tropics with the landmass outside the tropics being extremely dry and the Sahara- and Kalahari Deserts covering much of the north and south respectively. Apart from the tropics not being suitable for agriculture, rainfall is sparse and long and harsh droughts frequent. This naturally results in deforestation, soil erosion, environment degradation, drought and sometimes flooding when it does rain. Widespread drought conditions have led to food shortages in every region of Africa (famine occurred in 22 African countries during the '80's), leading to poor living conditions, malnutrition, mass migrations, poor health and disease.² These conditions are expected to increase.

Disease-Triggered Disasters. Africa's infectious disease burden is higher than any other region in the world, ac-

counting for more than 20% of the world's global burden of disease while its population represents less than 10% of the world's total. Effects range from very high infant mortality to a continent-wide life expectancy of less than 50 years. The "Phantom Warriors"³ of disease afflicting Africans can be grouped into four categories:

- The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the active symptom complex of infection with HIV called Aids (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome).
- Ebola-Zaire and other hemorrhage fever-causing viruses.
- Drug resistant and lethal strains of prevalent diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria.
- Preventable epidemic diseases such as measles and infectious diarrhea caused by typhoid or cholera.

Shortage of Resources. 59 Years of drought in southern Africa effects most states far to the north as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This also impacts on severe food shortages that are being experienced with the population in regions with underdeveloped infrastructure, often resorting to shallow wells or stagnant pools that are easily contaminated with human and animal waste. These conditions are leading to mass migrations, posing additional problems for neighboring nations. Drought and conflict are already interwoven as strategic issues in many parts of Af-

rica with the availability of water increasingly acting as catalyst for armed conflict in the future. It is particularly tough in Egypt, where the population of 61 million is growing by 1 million every nine months. Egypt already imports 65% of its food and the situation could grow far worse. The flow of the Nile, Egypt's only major water supply, could be significantly reduced in coming years as upstream neighbors Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan divert more of the river's water.⁴ Another example is illustrated in Swaziland, where 60 000 refugees from the civil war in Mozambique are sharing the tiny kingdom's already limited water supply. Concern over access to this limited resource is provoking serious tensions between farmers, refugees and the government.

CULTURAL ISSUES

Future wars and violent conflicts will be shaped by breakdowns in the redistributive capacity of government, and by failure of entire cultures to compete in the post-modern age. African polarization of wealth, afflicting countries and organizations as well as individuals in the region, may prove insurmountable, and such inequities could spark various forms of class warfare more brutal than anything previously imagined. A preview of the future may be evident in Sierra Leone, where rebels under the leadership

of Today Sankoh are perpetrating vicious terror against a helpless population by amputating their hands and feet to coerce them into supporting the rebel cause.

The incompetence of the state becomes another reason for conflict, where state structures only survive through their ability to apply coercion and violence. Unfortunately government shortcomings, inept and oppressive political authorities, high level corruption and personal enrichment, lead inevitably to tensions that engulf the state and threaten to destroy it.

The historical impact on ethnicity and religion that transgresses boundaries and borders impact on the region and gives the potential conflict a broader agenda. Potential examples are

- The government of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the DRC) reflected the symptoms of corruption, nepotism and kleptocracy, promoting ethnic conflict. The absence of a democracy in DRC led to economic stagnation and environmental degradation⁵ which still has unmeasurable consequences.
- Laurent Kabila, the present leader of the DRC, promised a democracy, an end to corruption and control of the borders. Unfortunately his track record since taking office has been characterized by dictatorship, corruption and weak control of the borders with Uganda and Rwanda.

- In Sierra Leone, the democratically elected President Tejan Kabbah's (1996) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leader Foday Sankor's inability to accommodate each other's organizations are leading to the worst kind of terrorism against the population thinkable. The main reason? The country's diamonds, which include some of the very best gems produced anywhere in the world.⁶

- The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea where an arbitrary line drawn by Italian colonists between pieces of arid land and access to the Red Sea is proving to be enough to provoke full-scale war.

- Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe's decision to send troops to the DRC has not proved to be popular. The country with its economic health already in jeopardy, cannot afford the cost incurred in the DRC (from 50- to 100 million Zimbabwe dollars). High inflation and the Zimbabwe dollar losing 60% of its value had a negative impact on living conditions and is resulting in domestic dissatisfaction.⁷

- In the case of Angola, the former Portuguese colony in southwest Africa endowed with enormous reserves of diamonds, oil and timber, the conflict between Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement and the government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, continues.

- Smaller scale tension in Lesotho, Namibia, Mali and Nigeria are other examples in the region.

SOCIAL ISSUES

Prior to 1990, Africa's ignorance of how well others lived curbed man's natural rage at wealth discrepancies. The post-Cold War era allowed for a media dominated, international environment that painted the potential the wealth holds. Unhealthy political competition and the absence of a civil society and "middle class" centralized domestic affairs with primarily one party in the government. This dynamic, largely uncontrolled vacuum creates a market exploited by intrastate (as in the case of rival clans and "warlords" like Mohammed Aideed in Somalia) and international criminal enterprise or the so-called "Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)"⁸ towards controlling the flows of goods and people within and across the region's borders. This is an ideal and prosperous environment where states in transition have unique vulnerabilities which criminal organizations exploit ruthlessly in effort to ensure that such states remain safe havens within which and from which their organizations can engage in a variety of criminal enterprises with a high degree of immunity. South Africa in its transition towards a democracy being a very good example of this.⁹

EXTERNAL ISSUES

The key is "is there a market?" Failing states like Somalia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone with their rival clans, warlords as well as the role that the government will play in their effort to exert power are conditions that promote proliferation of small arms. The developing community in Africa like South Africa and Nigeria (where there is considerable wealth, but which are socio-economically unstable), becomes a market for the drug trade.

Small Weapons Proliferation. According to Glenn Oosthuizen *"... small arms continue to be so important in shaping southern Africa that they could ultimately determine whether peace, stability, and development of crime, violence, and conflict reign in the region."*¹⁰ Failure to control their possession and flows has resulted in both the creation and exacerbation of instability. The extent of illegal proliferation in Africa is on the increase, enhancing the culture to solve "problems" over the barrel of a gun. Examples are:

- In Mozambique estimates vary from 1.5 to 6 million illegal weapons originally employed in the civil war between soldiers of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), Mozambique's National Resistance (RENAMO), the people's militia, village chiefs and community leaders.

- No credible statistics are available in Angola. Known statistics however state that up to 700 000 weapons were additionally distributed by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) after the 1996 failure of elections. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement is receiving eastern European assistance and is now fighting with a renewed vigor.¹¹

- Ethiopia is estimated to have spent approximately \$300 million on arms since Jun 1998 with Eritrea spending an unknown but likely proportionate amount. The main suppliers of weaponry are Bulgaria, China and Russia.¹²

- Two British companies (Sky Air Cargo of London and Occidental Airlines), that also supplied weapons to rebels in the DRC, were secretly flying small arms and mortars to the rebels in Sierra Leone (400 tons)¹³ during the peak of the war.

Drugs. Urbanized areas and governments in transition in southern Africa are already beginning to feel the sting of increased crime and violence associated with the drug trade. South Africa as an example is already one of the world's leading marijuana producers with heroin, cocaine and Mandrax a growing market. Countries like Nigeria, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Angola¹⁴ are affected the most.

IMPACT OF THESE THREATS ON SOCIETY

The result; an ungovernable region exploited by dictators, criminality and non-state actors (international and domestic), with only the basic state structures in place. In other words, states that are failing. A failing state is characterized by the following:

- The deterioration and collapse of the central government authority and the inability to address and coordinate future threats in the state.
- The macroeconomic collapse of the state involving hyperinflation, massive unemployment and net decreases in the GNP as in the case of Angola and the DRC for 1998.¹⁵
- Ceasing of existing ecological, developmental, humanitarian, etc programs in place.

Complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) as the result, are currently capturing international attention as the most significant immediate problems in southern Africa. They evolve over a long time and are defined by the following common characteristics:

- Episodic food insecurity that frequently deteriorates into mass starvation and population movement.
- Widespread disease, suffering and death.

- Ethnic or religious conflict, empowered vigilantism and widespread human rights abuses.
- A discouraged rural population (have nots) in a failed state environment.

The Problem. History, supported by slavery and colonial intrastate oppression in the 19th century has imposed on the region a culture of the stronger reigns. Dominating one another and solving ones problems over the barrel of a gun has been established as the culture.

The Frenchman, Gen. Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, Commander in Algeria (1841-1847), words' still ring true "We have never got anything from these people except through force. We often tried to bring them around by means of persuasion, but it didn't work. Either they never responded or they told us that we would first have to shoot it out and that if we won, then they would submit".¹⁶

This culture unfortunately manifests in destructive ways to name but a few:¹⁷

	DICTIONAL AUTHORITY/- TERRITORIAL DISPUTES	ETHNIC ISSUES	OTHER
WEST AF- RICA	<p>Ghana and Guinea's radical Pan-African policy from 1957 against opposing neighbors</p> <p>Nigeria has a leadership battle</p> <p>Pol consciousness of the armed forces from 1963 led to countless coups in especially Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Benin</p> <p>Liberian war-, crime lords in early '90's</p>	<p>Ghana and Togo dispute</p> <p>Ethnic cleansing in Sierra Leone</p>	<p>Domestic, political change and radical regimes are prime causes of inter-state conflict from 1960. This takes place in the form of state-supported subversion.</p> <p>War over resources in Sierra Leone</p>
EAST AF- RICA	<p>Somalia (war-lordism)¹⁸</p> <p>Ethiopia-Eritrea's dictatorial/-territorial dispute</p>		<p>Irredentism as in the case with Ethiopia-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia</p> <p>Humanitarian intervention as in the case of Tanzania-Uganda war of 1978-79</p>
CENTRAL AFRICA	<p>The Libya/Chad conflict</p> <p>Pres Mobutu's dictatorial leadership led to his overthrow</p>	<p>War between the Hutu and the Tutsi (in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi)</p>	<p>War over resources in the DRC influencing countries in the sub-region</p>
SOUTHERN AFRICA	<p>The ambitions of President Dos Santos/Jonas Savimbi in Angola</p> <p>President Mugabe's (Zimbabwe) ambitions has domestic repercussions</p>		<p>War over resources in Angola</p>

Taking only the above-mentioned few examples, it seems as if power, territory and limited resources are high on the list of reasons for conflict in the sub-regions.

Ungovernability unfortunately, seems to be the end-result that manifests sub-regionally the most. Ungovernability has been defined as *"...the declining ability of governments... to govern, to carry out the various responsibilities of managing a modern state in an increasing complex environment"*.¹⁹

ROLEPLAYERS IN AFRICA

Developed Countries. Is global dynamics marginalizing Africa?" The answer would lie at the doorstep of international interests²⁰ in Africa as well as international development that is taking precedence over African affairs.

Three reasons for security concern could be:

- Firstly, the situation in central/eastern Europe as well as the Middle East is turning out to be more challenging for the west and the EC than anticipated. The issues in the Balkans, Russia's economic health and the safeguarding of it's WMD, NATO's enlargement, the EU's troubling development and the ongoing Iraq and Israeli-Palestinian issues, have ensured that the industrialized countries will make these strategic regions their overseas priority for some years to come.²¹
- Secondly, growing concern over the health and transnational threats in central and southern America as well as

the declining, economic health in Asia defers attention away from Africa.

- Thirdly, international effort in Africa so far had no positive results with no positive expectations for the future.

Economically, attempts on maintaining trade in the region by primarily Japan, Brazil, India, the US²² and the EC,²³ is continuing. Other, mainly US inspired flickers of hope seems to be President Clinton's call on the industrialized community to cancel African debt to the amount of US\$70 billion dollars.²⁴ The continuing US effort in establishing the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the newly established African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), though limited in extent, also inspires.

International Organizations. The opinion that-"*..existing tendencies of prescriptive involvement in the internal affairs of the Third World by international and multinational organizations such as the IMF, World Bank and the UN, are bound to intensify*"²⁵, could turn on the regional organizations and become a problem. If not carefully addressed, this could result in countries finding other means to address their problems. Other implications of being overly prescriptive could be the uninformed turning towards each other to survive and usually address the immediate threats

to the detriment of sound, long-term strategies. Failing states could also accept any possible source of revenue and become the battleground for opportunists in numerous programs that will assist its decline.

Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations. The OAU was formed in 1963 primarily to spearhead the struggle against colonialism. It seems no longer to have a clear mandate. Indications are that the OAU has been plagued by inefficiency, regional leaders with their own personal agendas and above all, very limited resources. Does it earn the criticism of being a little more than an exclusive club for African leaders? Signals for the OAU to get its act together have been in abundance. Singled out, some are:²⁶

- The paradigm shift from the "noninterference barrier" towards formal intervention into intrastate affairs was authorized during the 29th Annual OAU Assembly of the Heads of State and Government in June 1993.
- The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in the organization's secretariat has been formalized.
- A policy group called the Central Organ, is giving operational counsel and legal authority to the secretary general on a week-to-week basis.

- The permanent members of the UN Security Council have been sending signals since 1992 that they will not intervene in every internal conflict in the future.

In some cases the sub-regional structures play a larger role in their specific regions due to the focused approach and personal effect of the members of these structures. Multilateral liaison between sub-regional parties (ECOWAS and SADC primarily), with the exclusion of OAU, also seems to take place more and more.

Formulizing and enlarging UN/OAU relations and mandating the employment of sub-regional resources towards Africa's problems could be some of the first steps that the OAU could take to regain stature. Only by a focussed effort towards African solutions, will international support be warranted and forthcoming.

African States. Trends towards African models of state building and for African solutions to African problems seem to be more prominent in developing countries in the region. Leaders show a much clearer understanding of economic realities in the region and what role little governance may play in supporting the effort of state building. Unfortunately states still tend towards individualized effort in the region with regimes remaining inherently authoritarian due to the absence of political institutions and opposition

parties. The result: "...solutions provided ... will inevitably entail more use of force."²⁷

Non-State Actors. The combination of the lack of sub-state actors and a middle class, the enormous potential that Sub-Saharan Africa allows in resources and the vulnerability of the region to instability, creates a vacuum that is quickly filled by numerous non-state actors that wants to seize the opportunity of this market. The influence of transnational companies like Zimbabwean mining projects in the southern regions of the DRC, criminal cartels and warlords, over zealous security organizations²⁸ or soldiers of fortune tend to overwhelm state structures. Opportunity in the market is traded for services with financial gains leaving the country to the detriment of development and sosio-economic conditions.

STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT CENTURY

The divergent nature of threats foreseen in the new millennium requires countries forming partnerships based on strong security and economic foundations.²⁹ Top-down sub-regional strategies to address area-own threats with tailor-made responses are the only way to ensure maximum impact in the medium and long term.

What will this require? In the absence of "the will"³⁰ from the international community towards Africa, it has be-

come time that Africa show interest in its own destiny for the future. An aggressive across the board strategy is required where "shaping" rather than "trying to cure" in the key areas are critical. In essence it might entail:

- A multinational approach (*coalition of the willing*), unpopular to some (countries), but benefiting the whole (the sub-region), is required.
- The focus of effort - alternating between the economical- and aggressive diplomacy, consecutively supported by the remaining elements of power.
- The military element of power should only be employed as last resort and only to empower the focus of effort; diplomacy or the economy. Criteria for employment of this element of power could be to safeguard the security of the partnership or to create conditions for the employment of the main effort.³¹

AFRICAN RENNAISSANCE

Africa for Africans emphasizes the African role in dealing with their own problems and focussing on a continental rebirth for a new life and common destiny. "It means the development of the society in political and socio-economic spheres. The democratization of states, proper governance, economic development and the ability to trade...".³²

Africa for the Africans should not mean that Africa should try and go it alone. It requires an aggressive strategy, feasible in its implementation and rewarding in its systematic completion.

Regional Interests.

Why be interested in the health of the region? If the country you reside in has a healthy economy, is secure in its geo-strategic, domestic and political spheres and the concept of human rights is prevalent to the extent that you are satisfied to live there, why bother with it? The answer lies in regionalism. The impact of the region impacts on the safe haven you belong to. Africa with its bad record is no different.

The first challenge for regional and sub-regional Africa is determining these interests. The second would be to derive core regional and sub-regional objectives that would become drivers for individual strategies and foreign policies in the sub-regions. Yes, *different strategies for different threats with different primary focus areas (priorities), per sub-region*, are required. Typical sub-regional interests and related objectives might entail the following:³³

SUB-REGIONAL INTERESTS	POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sub-regional stability; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Control small arms proliferation. • Integrate all private armies under government control. • Establish Interagency Ops Centers (IOCs) regionally.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sub-regional access; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulize and empower trade organizations like the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). • Contract sub-regional, private intelligence organizations. • Integrate civil and military intelligence organizations in the sub-region under Civil-Mil Ops Centers (CMOCs).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sub-regional safety; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safeguard embassy personnel.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sub-regional civility and cooperation for a common good; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formalize sub-regional organizations with active, capable and objective structures.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sub-regional safety; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Change of culture to diplomacy as focus of effort.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accountable governance and managerial competence; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratize (feasible democracies), countries.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish a capable civil society and middle class.

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- | | |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustained socio-economic development; | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish a sub-regional bureaucracy/structures. • Establish agriculture in the sub-region as priority in feeding this region. • Maintain established programs like USAID, etc. • Establish commitment and international trust to have foreign debt cancelled. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unthreatened natural environment; | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop the infrastructure to restrict the exploitation of the environment. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sub-regional control of criminality. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish capable and integrated police services dedicated towards fighting crime. • Ensure regional and international crime prevention assistance. |
-

Role of the Instruments of National Power. The problem of failing states is not first and foremost a military responsibility and the solutions anything but short term. What is required is a long-term, multifaceted engagement that will promote the growth of institutions and patterns of legitimate governance. This can only be accomplished if an integrated, aggressive strategy is followed. A total strategy, employing all components of national and international power (political/diplomatic, economic and military), in a focused effort to "shape"³⁴ the region (in order to prevent

rather than cure) and achieve prioritized strategic objectives that would allow maximum impact.

"If the United States seeks enduring regional stability, military intervention to halt a conflict may not be an effective way to achieve such conditions. ... it would be preferable (and less expensive) to prevent the malady rather than attempting to cure it. In other words, to stress prevention rather than cure". ³⁵

Political/Diplomatic. This author is of opinion that this is the primary instrument to be used in Africa and be regarded as the focus of effort to ensure a change of culture. It is crucial that the OAU and the sub-regional structures (African organizational identities) are mobilized and used to collectively change the direction of a nation or governing authority by peaceful means. A variety of diplomatic capabilities (public diplomacy, unofficial diplomacy, foreign-affairs agencies, diplomacy by domestically oriented government agencies, etc), should be developed to replace the predominant employment of the military as instrument of power. Possible non-military options could entail:³⁶

- "Coercive Diplomacy". The concept of *compellance* or a *blackmail strategy*.

- "Drawing the Line". The sub-regional effort in drawing the line to indicate that further action could provoke a stronger response.
- "Buying Time to Explore a Negotiated Settlement". This defensive strategy may be resorted to when the sub-regional organization is operating under a disadvantage, if the adversary has some merit or when the organization wants to safeguard its interests through negotiation.
- "Retaliation and Reprisals". May have to be accomplished by deterrent threats.
- "Engaging in a Test of Capabilities". If the sub-region is confronted by a relatively low-level, controlled challenge to the status-quo, a blockade as an example may be used as deterrent.

Economical. The decision to employ this instrument of power should be considered well in advance and if decided upon, done so in a collective manner. Southern Africa's lacking sosio-economic conditions is seen as one of the catalysts for conflict in the region and imposing further economic restrictions could impact the so-called African Renaissance. It must be realized however that if the countries in question priorities are wrong (choosing guns over butter), the region will have no option but to act. The economic instrument of power ought to be used in conjunc-

tion with diplomacy and while this is taking place, humanitarian assistance from the sub-region should not be excluded. Implementing the economical instrument of power could entail the following:

- Domestic policies could be influenced through measures like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance or the lack thereof, the World Bank or even restrictions imposed on sub-regional (SACU) or international trade.
- These same agencies and international organizations while punishing could also play a very large role in rewarding by means of foreign trade, foreign aid, investment and loans. The sub-regional middle class and civil societies should be focus-points to enhance governability in the region.

Military. One of the biggest reasons for employing military power in Africa is because it is an instrument that is available and can be employed quickly with fast results. Doesn't the employment of military force enhance the culture of solving problems over the barrel of a gun? STRATFOR, a US intelligence firm maintains an interesting opinion. Why send troops (as part of a UN, Chapter VI Peacekeeping operation) into a scenario where factions decided that they need negotiation assistance. The EXIT Strategy in a Chapter VI operation dictate that these forces will withdraw anyway if conflict continues. Wouldn't


4000 civilian peacekeepers³⁷ or an internationally accepted security firm fulfill the demobilizing and protection functions as well as military forces? Accepted, in some case the use of military forces will serve as the only possible deterrent. The following requirements should then apply:

- A military force should be part of a sub-regional coalition (preferably based on an existing alliance), and function under the auspice of the existing and empowered sub-regional organization.
- This force will only be used if all other instruments of power failed and if a decision to "do nothing" is no option.
- If military force is employed, it should be employed in mass and be prepared to remain in the theater of operations for an undetermined time.
- Employing military force should be well planned and prepared for to ensure that it serves only as a deterrent. Becoming militarily involved must be regarded as a failure with the outcome of a possible withdrawal considered.

"...use of military force should be a policy means of last resort, and then only in cases where military objectives can be clearly identified and defined".³⁸ Weinberger Doctrine and Gen. Colin Powell's view when to use force

A MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY

Countries in southern Africa appear more willing to support involvement in the region if it is undertaken as part of a coalition. In this way, the region policeman's burden is placed on the doorstep of the OAU and UN. To function as part of a multinational organ allows for greater authority and usually has a regional mandate. Its efforts promise affordability and most important of all, it creates relations critical for sub-regional growth. It is not going to be easy. Peace operations (employing all instruments of power) are less desperate than war and this impacts on the relationships of the coalition partners.³⁹ Africa is a very large continent (the continent spans the United States of America three times). The span of control in the region should be manageable, with sub-regional organizations remaining accountable and efficient in their ability to detect and then control these areas. Current sub-regional organizations do exist in the region (although organized for development purposes):⁴⁰



If these organizations can be redirected to take responsibility and collectively manage sub-regional security affairs, a sound basis for cooperation has been created. Collective sub-regional security will depend on:

- Interdependence and Cooperative Security. African countries are currently realizing their interdependency with a move towards closer political/diplomatic ties, economic trading partnerships and even formal alliances as in the case with the Association of Southern African States (ASAS), the southern Africa's Inter-state Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the SACU for trading purposes.

- Role of Alliances and Coalitions. Continental consensus is a critical success factor for all matters relating to the region. The saying "*The only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them*",⁴¹ is being realized more and more. Officially, the formulization of alliances (a formal arrangement with broad, long-term objectives),⁴² for security purposes as well as forming coalitions (an informal agreement for common action),⁴³ are still very new concepts in Africa. Some of the closest examples of coalitions are training in combined and coordinated (mainly intelligence) operations and the recent peace support exercises BLUE HUNGWE (1997) and BLUE CRANE to take place in South Africa in April 1999. Another example could be the partnerships that were formed between the countries participating in the conflict in the DRC. Africa sees the benefit of a collective approach to solving its problems with the focus on the "African Renaissance", as an ideal vehicle.⁴⁴ Even South Africa, one of the newer additions to the OAU and the SADC, has changed its foreign policy to adopt an interdependent approach of solving sub-regional problems.

- Concept of a Lead Nation. Questions about how the distribution of power within a region may have an impact on the prospects for regional cooperation usually generate two sets of responses. On the one hand there are those that suggest an equal balance of power in a sub-region with a process of collective decision-making. The main reason for this choice is arguments against the second response, and that is the concept of a lead nation per sub-region. The main reason for the response of collective decision-making is fear of establishing a dominant hegemon and a 'neo-colonial' relationship in the sub-region.⁴⁵ South Africa is clearly a leading power in the southern sub-region, ranking the largest in terms of economic activity (accounting for 75% of all goods and services produced) and third largest in terms of land area.⁴⁶ Even after the democratization of this state, sub-regional actors tend to hinder its spreading influence into southern Africa because of some distrust and concern that larger members will misuse their political and economic power, or superior population size to coerce the smaller into agreements. The general opinion though is that a lead nation could have an inspiring and pulsating effect on the sub-region that could effect the mo-

mentum in a positive light. Lead nations being expected to carry more than its weight, should meet predetermined criteria. Typical criteria could entail a sound economic base, being domestically stable, a democracy, trusted by the sub-region and capable of enforcing the elected strategy in the sub-region. Pivotal states like South Africa in SADC, Nigeria in ECOWAS, Ethiopia in IGAD and Chad in ECCAS could become lead nations in their respective sub-regions.

"What really defines a pivotal state is its capacity to affect regional and international stability. ... A pivotal state's steady economic progress and stability, on the other hand, would bolster its regions economic vitality and political soundness and benefit American trade and investment".⁴⁷

- Democracy. Thabo Mbeki, the South African President elect is of opinion that a democracy and economic development are key components in the achievement of an African renaissance. The full extent of a democracy however has different meaning to different role-players and there isn't a single model of democracy to be copied for all sub-regions. Uganda as an example is referred to as a democracy, but has a one party state. The population however may elect provincial authorities. Is this not a democracy? Certain core princi-

ples towards a democracy that is applicable to Sub-Saharan Africa, could entail:⁴⁸

- The accountability of rulers towards citizens for their actions.
- An institutional system of governance (written body of laws undergirded by a written constitution), known and adhered to by all. As important is a collective mandate and system to enforce this system of governance (an efficient judiciary).
- The creation of a second level of governance or non-governmental pillars of democracy in the form of other parties, civic groups, trade unions, think tanks and a free media.⁴⁹
- Fostering a market-oriented economy to ensure sustained economic development.⁵⁰
- Citizens must remain the most distinctive element. Unqualified restrictions imposed on citizens that impede freedom opposes the culture of a democracy.
- Trade. "...with few exceptions, the major arteries of transport in southern Africa reflect the historical integration of the region's trade with former colonial powers".⁵¹ This reflects on two basic problems of Sub-Saharan Africa trade. Trade with the international community is

much larger than intra-regional trade as portrayed in the SACU export statistics for 1993.⁵² It reflects distrust (the degree to which countries are 'looking at' each other), in southern Africa. The second imbalance found are countries depending on the same type of goods for export revenues. Hence, not only are they competitors in the same markets, their economies are likely to suffer specific market crises more or less simultaneously. A sensible, sub-regional economic policy is a prerequisite for rapid growth. In turn, increased rapid economic growth is essential to bring improved welfare to the people of the sub-regions and to ensure basic macro-economic stability. "Pampering" oneself by accepting marginal growth is not acceptable. Taken into consideration that the population is increasing at a rate of approximately 3%, 4% growth rate in the region will not be enough. What are needed are aggressive and responsible African leaders that understand the concept of "**for the common good**". Sound and responsible economic policies, specialization of goods (to prevent sub-regional competition), and massive intra-regional trade that is coordinated by sub-regional economic forums like the SACU and COMESA, are also critical for success.

Conclusions. Ungovernability, weak socio-economic conditions and cultural peculiarities of states in the reg-

gion have evolved to become the main problem of Sub-Saharan Africa. Military force becomes the "power" to manipulate, gain access to and eventually enhances an already "ungovernable" condition that is characterized by an unstable climate with the perception that the "most powerful" dominates. Only when power are translated to the people, will a move towards democracy start. As important are sub-regional and regional cooperation towards the common good that will only be achieved by acknowledging that "together is more".

EFFECTING A MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY

One of the less talked about subjects is "ways" to address the intricate problems of Sub-Saharan Africa. When reflecting on the different possible "ways" of a strategy, numerous aspects form "core elements or basic principles" that remain critical even if the "ways" vary. They form the basis of a strategy on which it should be built and from which it can evolve and maneuver.

Core Elements. The following underlying principles form the basis on which the different concepts to follow (ways to solve Africa's problems), could evolve:

- Close UN, OAU and sub-regional relations to ensure global participation and allow legitimacy.
- A culture of multinationalism that empowers action in the region. If a preemptive SADC, OAU and UN consensus regard-

ing the situation in the DRC were reached collectively, the course of events might have been different.

- A capable, proficient and empowered OAU with efficient sub-regional organizations. It will create vehicles for collective, empowered and preferable preemptive action in the region.
- Efficient management on regional (OAU) and sub-regional (SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD and ECCAS) levels. It will allow for a preemptive and focussed strategy that would employ all the instruments of power. The freedom to involve the military instrument should be reserved only to collective decision-making.
- Current international programs in the region like the ACSS, the ACRI and the assistance in peace operations exercises like exercise BLUE CRANE should be maintained. Regional and sub-regional organizations should play a larger role in focussing and coordinating the international effort in the region.⁵³
- Stability remains a very important enabler for programs to be successful. In the eventuality that the military instrument of power is employed, it should be centrally controlled (from the OAU) and with overwhelming force to deter and prevent conflict. This lesson is proved in the case of

the DRC where seven countries are now engaged in war with a negative impact on the sub-region.

- The effect of the media should be controlled. Intervention should be directed by a preemptive multinational strategy and not based on emotion created by the media.

Options ("Ways") of Effecting a Strategy.

Ways in dealing with the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa in most cases will not be popular. Credibility and reliability should precede emotion and personal preference.

The following three concepts could act as ways of addressing security interests in the region:

- Concept 1: Cooperative Security. A formalized independent continental government⁵⁴ (the OAU with international liaison?) that is empowered to coordinate international and regional affairs with the focus on failing states, could be an answer to ungovernability. Stronger states like South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia could play an important role in sub-regional development. Trustees (from Africa and the international environment), should be appointed to failing states and are responsible (in conjunction with the continental government), to assist in creating a culture for change, tolerance and a stable sub-regional environment. Focus areas for further attention are government creation, democratization,

creating a civil society, sub-regional relations, disarming programs and the creation of a viable economic system to ensure socio-economic upliftment in the short term and an increase in economical growth in the long term. The best example of trusteeship was the Marshall Plan after the Second World War. It provided more than \$16 billion (\$114 billion in 1992), in bilateral economic assistance to the countries of western Europe, which were so ravaged by war as to constitute failing states. The US undertook not only to restore the economies of its defeated enemies, but also to reorganize the Italian, Japanese and Western German political systems along democratic lines. The result was the restoration of states that have proven to be economically productive, politically stable, and strongly supportive of a peaceful international system.⁵⁵

- Concept 2: Combination between Cooperative Security/Selective Engagement. An organization of the willing to be formed along the same lines as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the only deliberate man-made software to manage alliances and coalitions ever. NATO to address security and the European Union (EU) as economical vehicle can act as example for an African Treaty Organization (ATO) in Africa. The benefits of such a system is its proven success and the fact that it is existing systems

that can be copied. Strong African economies in the region should form the foundation for an alliance with supporting multinational assistance programs. Under the UN, OAU and ATO supervision, willing countries may gain access to the alliance if they are prepared to adhere to preset criteria for membership. One of the criteria for membership could entail being accessible for change (or being shaped). The democratization of the governing systems, governability, regional integration and civil control over the military could be first steps towards transformation. Non-member countries, failed states beyond repair⁵⁶ and "rogue" states must be isolated as far as possible from member countries to prevent their deteriorating influences. The concept of trusteeship is also applicable here especially to ensure equal growth in sub-regional context that will prevent hegemonic aspirations.

- **Concept 3: Selective Engagement.** This option entails focussing support for development towards pivotal states (or islands of prosperity), rather than failing states. The intent is to create an "oil spot" effect per sub-region that will effect neighboring failing states in a positive light. This process is long-term in nature and requires discipline in the sense that countries not part of the "inner circle" be isolated in order not to inflict its declining influence

on the pivotal states. As the "inner circle" grows, other countries "ready to be transformed" are to be drawn in to ensure a systematic escalation of development in the region. *"It is better to lose some then parts of all that will effect the whole in the long term anyway".*

Critical Success Factors towards an Effective Strategy. For any of the strategies to be effective, a range of CSF's are necessary:

- Regionalism in the continent should be embraced by adopting and adhering to a collective approach in all matters.
- Regional trust is critical to ensure sub-regional cooperation.
- Regional organizations should play an authoritative and more efficient role with the focus on collective security and cooperative development.
- Cultural and ethnic tolerance prevents it being exploited to destabilize a sub-region or country.
- Regional, sub-regional or even area stability is a prerequisite for development.
- Contrary to what the perception "Africa for the Africans" create, international support and direction in the region remains essential for success.

- For regional trust to manifest, equal and simultaneous growth remains a pre-requisite. To ensure that this becomes a possibility, countries should reconsider their roles and positions in the region. One of the most prominent areas to address would be countries individual foreign policies. Important aspects to consider are:

- Sub-Saharan Africa countries must restore their self-confidence and accept the role that they could play in sub-regional context.
- Officially formulated foreign policies should be based on clearly defined and prioritized national interests (similarly classified as in the case of the United States - vital, important and peripheral). National interests and clearly stated objectives should be an open source of information to maintain trust and cooperation.
- The policy should have an economic underpinning to create the culture for development.

CONCLUSIONS

The connection between economic prosperity and stability are numerous and powerful. The challenge of enhancing the quality of life and catching up on development demand immediate attention. Without social peace, the investment climate will worsen.⁵⁷ The economic stability most conducive

to poverty alleviation requires regional stability and sound economic policies.

The need to understand the cause and effect of threats in the different sub-regions are necessary to ensure that pre-emptive strategies are formed to address them.

It has become time that Africans realize that drastic action is required, that they cannot "go it alone" and that the region should accept responsibility in a collective manner.

The underlying hypothesis is that long-term prospects have never been better for Sub-Saharan Africa, and that prosperity is an attainable dream, as long as the region accepts its responsibilities and stand together in addressing it.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Security and economic alliances in the sub-regions of Africa will play a very important part in the building of close relationships. Sub-Saharan Africa must form a united front against sub-regional and regional threats and become the collective mouthpiece for the region in international affairs.

Regional and sub-regional organizations should play a controlling role in terms of international programs in the region. One such an example would be to play a decisive

role in ACRI programs in sub-region that are accessible on all levels of command.

A regional military capability (nothing less than a division in size) should be considered as a regional peace operations force. This force should originate from sub-regional countries in rotation (this is not a standing force). The command and control body of the force however should be a multinational (combined/joint) standing capability with extensive training and development support from the international community. Development priorities could entail strategic interagency integration and coordination and coalition-, intelligence- and psychological operations with the focus on quick planning and execution of contingency operations. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti by the US on 24 Sep 1994 where two contingencies (Chapter VI [peace keeping] and Chapter VI and a half [towards peace enforcement]) were planned and prepared for, should be considered.

A "democratic corps" of experts and professionals should be recruited and trained to involve itself in developing democratic countries. This "corps" should be answerable to regional and then sub-regional organizations to ensure coordination and focus where it is needed.⁵⁸

A strong economy remains the crux for democratization to maintain momentum. International and continental support to ensure that a positive effect in this field takes place, should also be a focus.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Ottaway, Marina. "Africa's New Leaders: African Solution or African Problem", *Current History*, May 1998: 209.

² Department of Defense, "United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa", Office of International Security Affairs, August 1995: 11.

³ Fox, C.W., Jr., "Phantom Warriors: Disease as Threat to US National Security", *Parameters*, Winter 1997-98: 4.

⁴ Ibid., 90.

⁵ Solomon, Hussein, "Some Reflections on the Crises in Zaire", *ISS Papers*, No 15, February 1997: 1.

⁶ Duodu, Cameron, "Sierra Leone: Land of Disaster and Division", January 18, 1999; available from (<http://www.mg.co.za>); Internet; 1.

⁷ Nkomo, Duduzile, "Zim anger over Mugabe's War", August 28, 1998; available from (<http://www.mg.co.za>); Internet; 1.

⁸ Williams, P., "Transnational organized Crime and International Security: A Global Assessment, " *Society under Siege: Crime, Violence and Illegal Weapons*, Institute for Security Studies, TCP Series, Vol. 1: 11. TCOs rise is inextricably linked to globalization and the crises of state authority, and because they are so deeply rooted in these structural changes, they cannot be dismissed simply as a modern form of familiar law and order challenge. In fact, they are one of the most important challenges not only at the end of the 1990's, but also for the next century.

⁹ Ibid., 23. "South Africa with its extensive air, sea and land infrastructure makes it a prime conduit for moving illegal cargoes... Long, porous border and weak border controls, including undermanned ports and numerous secondary airports, give drug traffickers and other smugglers nearly unlimited access to transport their goods".

¹⁰ Oosthuizen, Glenn, "Shooting the Golden Goose: Small-Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa", *War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Drugs, Armies, and Trade*, The World Peace Foundation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998: 64.

¹¹Gordon, Chris, "Eastern Europe aid bolsters UNITA," 15 Jan 1999; available from (<http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99jan2/15jan-angola.html>); Internet; 1. Savimbi's newly established business interests in eastern Europe [Bulgaria and the Ukraine], has won him additional T55a tanks, D30 medium-range [Russian] and G5 155mm howitzers [South African], 106mm field guns, ZU23 anti-aircraft guns, BM21 multiple rocket launchers and BMP 1 armored vehicles.

¹² STRATFOR, "The Ethiopian Offensive: Where does it End?" 9 Feb 1999; available from ([http://alert@stratfor.com\[SMTP:alert@stratfor.com\]](http://alert@stratfor.com[SMTP:alert@stratfor.com])); Internet; 1. Ethiopia now has 320 000 troops and Eritrea has 270 000 militia under arms. Where does these weapons go after the war?

¹³ Leppard, David, et al., "British Firms Arming Sierra Leone Rebels," 10 Jan 1999; available from (<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan 1999/s19990111british.htm>); Internet; 1.

¹⁴ Gelbard, Robert, S., "Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa," *War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Drugs, Armies, and Trade*, The World Peace Foundation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998: 178. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland is playing minor roles in the regional trade thereof.

¹⁵ Angola and the DRC are the only countries in the south African region that showed a negative growth for the year 1998.

¹⁶ Vandervort, Bruce, "Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa: 1830-1914," Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1998: 69. During the time of slavery and ethnic oppression, the culture of the stronger (military), prevailed. For Africa to become part of a civilized western world, this "power" must be focussed into strong economies. International national interest in Africa will in future be equivalent to Africa's economic role it can play.

¹⁷ Africa is divided in five areas as seen by the US Department of Defense.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Dorff, Robert, H., "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability", *Parameters*, Vol. 26, Issue 2, Summer 1996: 17.

²⁰ President Clinton's speech to 46 African ministers during the US-African Ministerial Partnership for the 21st Century Conference on 16 March 1999. The US had 36% return on its investment in 1998 in comparison to 13% from Europe and even less from the Middle East, Asia and the America's.

²¹ Dr Baynham, Simon, "The New World Order: Regional and International Implications for Southern Africa", *Africa Insight*, Vol. 22, No 2, 1992: 88.

²² The administration of President Clinton is still proposing the African Growth and Opportunity Act that will ensure free trade with selected African countries.

²³ The EU's first free trade agreement with a developing country, South Africa has been approved in March 1999. The potential for African trade after this big step is enlarging.

²⁴ The venue was the US-African Ministerial Partnership for the 21st Century Conference held in Washington, DC on 16 March 1999.

²⁵ Dr Baynham, Simon, "The New World Order: Regional and International Implications for Southern Africa", *Africa Insight*, Vol. 22, No 2, 1992: 84.

²⁶ Cohen, J., Herman, "Conflict Management in Africa," *CSIS Africa Notes*, February 1996, No 181: 2.

²⁷ Ottaway, Marina, "Africa's 'New Leaders': African Solution or African Problem?", *Current History*, May 1998, Vol. 97, No 619: 213.

²⁸ Angola had up to 35 security firms operating in Angola during 1999.

²⁹ Emphasized by John Weeks opinion of the role that regional groupings might play in the future. "...the only vehicle by which developing country governments can exert bargaining influence".

³⁰ An ongoing media portrayal of death and destruction, famine and the disregard for human rights and life by fellow Africans towards their own in the first place and secondly the potential waste of support in an ongoing drama that has no end, is impacting on the "will" and effort the international community invests in Africa.

³¹ The ideal would be the existing OAU and regional organizations as the only collective body under the UN that should have the authority for a mandate under these circumstances.

³² Maj. Gen. Masondo, A., "The African Renaissance," *Salut*, November 1998, Vol. 5, No 11.

³³ Col. Henk, Dan, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania has written extensively on the US National interests in Africa from which these interests are derived.

³⁴ The term "shaping" originates in the US National Security Strategy for a New Century dd Oct 1998: 8. The US "shaping" of the international environment allows for a safer global environment indirectly as well as preemption of possible conflict worldwide.

³⁵ Col. Henk, Dan, "Uncharted Paths, Uncertain Vision: US Military involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa in the wake of the Cold War", *INSS Occasional Paper 18: Regional Series*, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, US Airforce Academy, Colorado, March 1998: 19.

³⁶ Department of the Army, "Public Diplomacy", Department of National Security and Strategy, *Core Curriculum, Course 2: War, National Policy and Strategy*, US Army War College, Carlisle, Readings: Vol. 1: 254. This term has defensive and offensive uses but in general relates to a non-military strategy.

³⁷ STRATFOR, "Thinking about Peacekeeping" 16 Feb 1999; available from ([http://alert@stratfor.com\[SMTP:alert@stratfor.com\]](http://alert@stratfor.com[SMTP:alert@stratfor.com])); Internet; 4.

³⁸ Arnold, Edwin, J., Jr., "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Interest", *Parameters*, Spring 1994: 3.

³⁹ Baker, James, H., "Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations", *Parameters*, Spring 1994: 4.

⁴⁰ United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, August 1995: 25.

⁴¹ Col. Cancian, Mark F., "Is there a Coalition in your Future," *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 1996: 28.

⁴² Silkett, Wayne A., "Alliance and Coalition Warfare," *Parameters*, (Summer 1993): 75.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "Politics: Progress in Africa Eroded by Renewed Conflicts" 2 Oct 1998; available from (<http://www.bibim.com/anc>); Internet; 1. Mr. Annan is calling for a drastic and concerted effort by African states, the international community and the UN system to prevent further tragedy.

⁴⁵ Rowlands, Ian, H., "Mapping the Prospects for Regional cooperation in Southern Africa", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 5: 920.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 921. South African GDP for 1995 was US\$133.9 billion dollars against the nearest rival being Angola with US\$8.2. South African land area is 1221 000 square km against 2267 000 square km's of the DRC and 1247 000 square km's of Angola.

⁴⁷ Chase, Robert, S., et al, "Pivotal States and US Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1996, Vol. 75, No. 1: 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid. To refer to additional requirements for a democracy, only focus areas are addressed.

⁴⁹ Diamond, Larry, "Promoting Democracy", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1992, Vol. 87: 1.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Rowlands, Ian, H., "Mapping the Prospects for Regional cooperation in Southern Africa", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 5: 926.

⁵² Marshall, Katherine, "Regional Development Strategies and Challenges: Some Economic and Social Underpinnings", *War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Drugs, Armies, and Trade*, The World Peace Foundation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998: 157. Trade from southern Africa to the rest of the world - 62%, to southern Africa - 7%, to Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding southern Africa) - 2%, to the European Community - 22% and to North America - 7%.

⁵³ For a detailed discussion on US programs in Africa see the Department of State's National Strategy on Africa dated 1999.

⁵⁴ Mr. Mtshontshi, Ezra, Counselor at the Embassy of South Africa in Washington DC, interview by the author, 29 January 1999, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, US.

⁵⁵ Helman, GERALD, B., "Saving Failing States", *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 89, Winter 1992/93: 2.

⁵⁶ Somalia as an example of a state that has reached a point of "no-return". Sometimes it requires seemingly inhumane measures to allow a country to evolve to the level that it is ready to start from scratch.

⁵⁷ Marshall, Katherine, "Regional Development Strategies and Challenges: Some Economic and Social Underpinnings", *War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Drugs, Armies, and Trade*, The World Peace Foundation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998: 170.

⁵⁸ Diamond, Larry, "Promoting Democracy", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1992, Vol. 87: 5.

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